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FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT:
RESIDENT ALIENS NEED NOT APPLY
This Comment discusses the legal impediments on the con-
gressional and presidential power to deprive resident aliens
of federal civil service employment. The constitutional pro-
tections afforded resident aliens are examined, along with the
constitutional sources of congressional and executive power
over aliens. The Comment also analyzes the President's statu-
tory authority over federal civil service. The author concludes
that either an executive or a congressional prohibition on
alien federal civil service employment would violate the
alien's due process guarantee under the fifth amendment. In
addition, an Executive Order excluding aliens from federal
civil service employment is found to exceed the President's
statutory authority.
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong' struck
down a federal Civil Service Commision regulation which limited the
vast majority of civil service positions to American citizens and
nationals.2 The Court held that the Civil Service Commission had
exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the regulation.3 In
1. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
2. 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1977). This regulation provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he
is a citizen of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States.(b) A person may be given appointment only if he is a citizen of or
owes permanent allegiance to the United States. However, a noncitizen
may be given (1) a limited executive assignment under section 305.509 of
this chapter in the absence of qualified citizens or (2) an appointment in
rare cases under section 316.601 of this chapter, unless the appointment
is prohibited by statute ....
The term "owes permanent allegiance" is a term of art, generally referring to
those who are nationals of the United States. This was the interpretation of the
Supreme Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,90 n.1 (1976): "Appa-
rently the only persons other than citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the
United States are noncitizen 'nationals.' See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(21),(22), 1408."
(emphasis in original). Generally, nationals are people who are citizens of ter-
ritorial possessions of the United States. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.3c (rev. ed. 1977).
3. 426 U.S. at 114, 115.
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so ruling, the Court expressly declined to resolve the issue of whether
a similar restriction would be constitutional if imposed by Congress
or the President.4 This Comment will analyze the question left unre-
solved in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.'
The resolution of that question has both immediate and long-term
significance. Taking a cue from the Court's opinion, President Ford
issued Executive Order No. 11935,6 limiting employment in the com-
petitive service, with few exceptions, to citizens and nationals of the
United States.' Litigation challenging the constitutionality of the
Executive Order has already been commenced.8 Further, in the letter
accompanying the Executive Order,9 President Ford called for con-
gressional action on this issue.' Such legislation has since been
introduced."
4. Id. at 114, 116.
5. The issue with which the Court dealt in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong-
whether the Civil Service Commission exceeded its statutory authority-will no
be discussed in this Comment. The Comment will deal instead with the constitu,
tional and statutory limits on Congress and on the President in imposing a bar
on aliens in the federal civil service.
6. 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1977).
7. Id. The text of the Executive Order provides as follows:
(a) No person shall be admitted to competitive examination unless
such person is a citizen or national of the United States.
(b) No person shall be given any appointment in the competitive ser-
vice unless guch person is a citizen or national of the United States.
(c) The [Civil Service] Commission may, as an exception to this rule
and to the extent permitted by law, authorize the appointment of aliens
to positions in the competitive service when necessary to promote the
efficiency of the service in specific cases or for temporary appoint-
ments.
8. A motion was filed in the United States District Court for the Northerr
District of California on October 12, 1976, under the name of Mow Sun Wong V
Hampton, for an order implementing the Supreme Court decision in Hamptor
v. Mow Sun Wong.
9. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301, 37,303 (1976).
10. Id. at 37,304. "While I am exercising the constitutional and statutor.
authority vested in me as President, a recognition of the specific constitutiona
authority vested in the Congress prompts me to urge that the Congress prompt
ly address these issues."
11. At least two bills have been introduced in Congress. S. 3572, introduced i
the 94th Congress, did not pass. That bill would have amended 5 U.S.C. § 330
(1970) to limit federal civil service positions to United States citizens.
H.R. 1809 was introduced in the 95th Congress. It would amend subchapter
of chapter 33 of title 5 by adding the following new section:
§ 3328. Competitive Service; citizenship requirements.
An individual may not be admitted to a competitive examination held
by the Civil Service Commission or appointed in the competitive service
unless such individual-
(1) is a citizen of the United States; or(2) owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
See note 2 supra for definition of those individuals who owe "permanent a]
legiance to the United States."
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The federal civil service consists of "all appointive positions in the
executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the Government of the
United States, except positions in the uniformed services . ... "I'
The competitive service generally includes all civil service positions
in the executive branch. 13 It accounts for nearly three million posi-
tions in the federal government.1
4
This Comment examines the legal impediments on the congres-
sional and presidential power to impose a blanket deprivation of
federal civil service employment on aliens. The first .section deals
with the constitutional limitations on Congress. The second section
examines the President's statutory and constitutional authority to
issue Executive Order No. 1193 5. The conclusion reached is that both
congressional and executive directives imposing a blanket prohibi-
tion on alien federal civil service employment violate the constitu-
tional mandate of due process of law. In addition to the constitution-
al impediments, Executive Order No. 11935 is found to exceed the
statutory authority on which the President relied.
CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER ALIENS:
ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE
A "permanent resident" is an alien who has entered the United
States under an immigrant visa.15 To obtain such a visa, the alien
must satisfy certain prescribed qualitative 6 and quantitative 17 re-
In allowing no exceptions for the "efficiency of the service" or the "national
interest," the scope of exclusion under H.R. 1809 would be even broader than
that under Exec. Order No. 11935.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 2101(1) (1970).
13. Id. § 2102(a) defines the "competitive service" as:
(1) all civil service positions in the executive branch, except-(A) positions which are specifically excepted from the competi-
tive service by or under statute; and(B) positions to which appointments are made by nomination for
confirmation by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise di-
rects ....
14. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 129 (G. Delury ed. 1977).
15. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)
(1970); id. § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); id. § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 [The
Immigration and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act].
16. There are 32 bases upon which an alien may be denied an immigrant visa.
These are listed in id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West Supp. 1977).
17. Exclusive of certain exceptions, the quota system allots a total of 170,000
immigrant visas annually to countries in the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000
annually to Western Hemisphere countries. Id. § 201(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a). In
addition, an annual limit of 20,000 is placed on the number of immigrant visas
available to any one country. Id. § 202(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152(a).
quirements and must follow the requisite procedures. 8 Once admit-
ted, the alien classified as a permanent resident is entitled to remain
indefinitely, 9 unless deported for engaging in specific, proscribed
activities. ° A non-immigrant, by contrast, is admitted for a fixed
period of time.21 A condition of his stay is that he depart within that
specific time limit.
22
While a restriction on federal civil service employment to United
States citizens and nationals effectively bans all aliens and refugees,
the scope of this Comment is limited to those aliens who are classified
as "permanent residents., 21 It is therefore necessary to examine the
sources of federal power over aliens and the constitutional protec-
tions afforded the permanent resident alien.
There is no direct constitutional authority granting Congress pow-
er over immigration, deportation, or regulation of aliens within the
United States.24 Since the first general immigration statute was
enacted in 1881,25 the courts have formulated various theories to
support congressional control over these matters.
In one of the earlier cases,26 the Supreme Court upheld the congres-
sional right to control immigration as an exercise of the power to
regulate foreign commerce. Shortly thereafter, congressional au-
thority over immigration was held to be an "incident of sover-
eignty." 28 According to the Court, the government has the power to
exclude foreigners from this country whenever, in its judgment, the
18. See generally 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE §§ 3.1-3.28b (rev. ed. 1977).
19. Id. § 2.5c.
20. I. & N. Act § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970).
21. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.6b(1)
(rev. ed. 1977).
22. Id. § 2.6b(2).
23. Throughout this Comment, the term alien, unless otherwise specified,
refers to an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. An argument can
be made that the same rights should be extended to other aliens, particularly
refugees paroled into the United States pursuant to I. & N. Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5) (1970). See Comment, Extending the Constitution to Refugee-
Parolees, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 139 (1977); Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The
Dilemma of the Indochina Refugees, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1975).
24. The only constitutional powers which appear directly related to aliens
are the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4, and perhaps the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, id., cl. 3.
25. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
26. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
27. These cases upheld that part of the Act of Aug. 3, 1882, which provided
that a shipowner must pay a duty of 50 for each passenger not a citizen of the
United States who arrived by vessel from a foreign port to a port within the
United States. Support for the regulation was found in the commerce clause, as
opposed to the 'taxing power of Congress.
28. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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public interests require such exclusion. 29 Four years later, the Su-
preme Court justified the power to expel aliens as an exercise of
control over foreign relations, commerce, naturalization and war.30
Any power which Congress may have over aliens, whether con-
stitutional or as an "incident of sovereignty," is tempered by the
constitutional rights granted aliens. While aliens do not enjoy status
entirely equal to that of United States citizens, aliens who have
entered this country are entitled to many of the same rights.3 ' The
fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the federal government
and the states, respectively, from depriving any "person" of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. The fourteenth
amendment requires equal protection of the law for any "person."
Settled case law has construed these provisions as applicable to
aliens.32
A series of recent Supreme Court cases has recognized that the
alien's right to equal protection precludes state discrimination
against aliens in civil service employment, 33 denial of state welfare
benefits to aliens,34 the refusal to admit aliens to the state bar exami-
nation,35 and barring certain resident aliens from state financial
assistance for higher education. 6
The fifth amendment, applicable to acts of the federal government,
contains no equal protection clause. It does, however, forbid dis-
crimination which is so unjustifiable as to violate due process.3 7 In
Boiling v. Sharpe,3 8 the Supreme Court expressly held that a failure
by the federal government to accord equal protection may conflict
with the due process guarantee of the fifth amendment. A federal
district court in In re Smith39 stated:
By characterizing the problem presented in this case as one of equal
protection, we do not mean to -suggest that fifth amendment due pro-
29. Id. at 606.
30. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-12 (1893).
31. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950).
32. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522 (1954); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
33. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
34. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
35. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
36. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct. 2120 (1977).
37. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
38. Id.
39. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
cess takes in all of fourteenth amendment equal protection. It is
enough to note that fifth amendment due process does include an
equal protection principle. . . and that the two provisions are coex-
tensive insofar as they prohibit discrimination based upon race...
and other discriminations which are invidious or deprive persons of
constitutional rights .... 40
Thus, the federal government, in imposing an "invidious" discrimi-
nation, ought to be bound, under the fifth amendment, by the same
standards which apply to state discrimination under the fourteenth
amendment. It has been argued by the federal government that its
"plenary power" over aliens may justify civil service employment
discrimination which would violate equal protection if indulged in
by the states.41 As will be shown, the bases of federal authority over
aliens, and the limits on other "plenary" powers, do not support this
theory.
Congressional power over the deportation and exclusion of aliens
appears so well settled as to foreclose further argument. 42 The right
of Congress to restrict the lawful conduct of aliens once admitted to
the United States is considerably less clear. Except for situations
dealing with alien registration,43 only in the recent case of Mathews
v. Diaz" has the Supreme Court extended the power to regulate
"conditions of entrance and residence of aliens" to justify a discrimi-
nation against aliens lawfully admitted and residing in this country.
In Mathews v. Diaz, the Court upheld a Medicare requirement
conditioning an alien's eligibility on five years continued residency
plus "permanent resident" status. Ironically, the Court relied on
Graham v. Richardson,4" which had invalidated citizenship and resi-
dency requirements for state welfare benefits, to justify its position.
According to the Court, one of the grounds for the Graham decision
was state encroachment upon the exclusive federal power over the
entrance and residence of aliens.4 6 Therefore, concluded the Court in
Mathews v. Diaz, the federal government, through this "exclusive"
power, has greater latitude than do the states in imposing unequal
burdens upon aliens.4
40. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
41. Brief for Appellee at 19-21, Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th
Cir. 1974).
42. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
43. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). It should be noted that the power
to require registration was justified by the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893), as necessary to carry out the power to admit or
expel aliens.
44. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
45. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
46. 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976).
47. Id. at 81, 82.
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The decision in Graham, however, was actually based on the prem-
ise that a state's refusal to grant welfare benefits to aliens conflicts
with federal regulations regarding the exclusion and deportation of
public charges.48 In support of its conclusion, the Court cited Truax
v. Raich4 9 to the effect that "'[t]he authority to control immigra-
tion-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested solely in the Federal
Government. . . . ,5 Upon close examination, there is nothing in
this language that suggests an expansion of the federal plenary pow-
er over aliens beyond that previously exercised-that is, exclusion,
deportation and registration.
In addition, it should be noted that the Graham Court held only
that the federal government-as opposed to the states-had exclu-
sive control over the regulation of aliens. The allocation of that
power between Congress and the courts is an entirely different ques-
tion. The vesting of the exclusive power over aliens in the federal
government does not necessarily lead to the implication that the
interpretation of Congress must take precedence over that of the
Supreme Court. Yet, by giving Congress virtually limitless power
over aliens, this is what the Court appears to have assumed in
Mathews v. Diaz.5
48. 403 U.S. at 377.
49. 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
50. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1971) (emphasis added).
51. Whatever the validity of the reasoning in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976), a reviewing court need not feel compelled to apply its conclusion to the
alien seeking federal employment. The situations can be distinguished on at
least two grounds:
First, Mathews v. Diaz dealt with a Medicare medical insurance program of
the Social Security Administration. Id. at 70. One half of the program's financ-
ing is provided by the federal government. Id. n.1. It could be argued that aliens
ought not to be entitled to rely on the generosity of the federal government
immediately upon arrival in this country. A questionable theory even in the
Medicare context, it has no force when applied to federal civil service employ-
ment. Through federal employment the alien seeks the opportunity to earn his
livelihood, to be self-sufficient, thereby avoiding reliance on welfare. Rather
than asking support from public funds the alien is seeking to contribute to his
new country.
A second distinction can be found in the Court's statement in Mathews v.
Diaz that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden
of advancing principled reasoning that will invalidate the line drawn by Con-
gress while tolerating a different line distinguishing some aliens from others. Id.
at 82. The Court in Diaz felt that appellees were unable to identify a principled
basis for prescribing such a different standard. Id. at 84. In the federal employ-
ment situation, rather than totally excluding aliens, a "different line" could
easily be drawn at positions sensitive to the national security (see text accom-
panying notes 106-12 & 116 infra) or at positions requiring a language skill or
The Supreme Court's words in Fong Yue Ting v. United States5 2
and Lem Moon Sing v. United States 3 should be remembered. While
upholding congressional power over the deportation of aliens, the
Court in Fong Yue Ting also affirmed that aliens residing in the
United States, as long as they are permitted by the government to
remain, are entitled to the protections of the Constitution and the
laws.5
4
In Lem Moon Sing, the congressional power to exclude aliens was
upheld, but the Court went on to emphasize that, while the alien
lawfully remains, he is entitled to the guarantees of life, liberty and
property which are secured by the Constitution to all those within
the jurisdiction of the United States. His personal rights while he is
in this country "are as fully protected by the supreme law of the land
as if he were a native or naturalized citizen of the United States."
55
The implication is clear that the Court interpreted the plenary
power over aliens as limited to deportation, and as long as that power
was not exercised, Congress had no authority to violate the constitu-
tional safeguards guaranteed the alien.
Granting the possibility of the extension of federal "plenary" pow-
er over aliens beyond exclusion and deportation, the statement of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Mow Sun Wong v. Hamp-
ton56 is pertinent: "To state that Congress' plenary power over aliens
enables the federal government to unreasonably discriminate against
aliens, neglects to consider the fact that even Congressional plenary
power is subject to Constitutional limits. '5 7
The Supreme Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong noted that
power over the exclusion and deportation of aliens is vested in the
political departments of the government. Therefore, according to the
Court, these matters are to be regulated by treaty or by act of Con-
gress except when the judicial department is required by the
paramount law of the Constitution to intervene. 58
educational level which some aliens may not possess (see text accompanying
notes 113-15 infra). Thus, it need not be argued, as did appellees in Diaz, that all
aliens must be treated equally with all citizens. The standards suggested would
suffice to "invalidate the line drawn" and provide some guidance in drawing a
different and more reasonable line.
52. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
53. 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
54. 149 U.S. at 724.
55. 158 U.S. at 547.
56. 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 1036.
58. 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976), citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 713 (1893).
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The importance of balancing the personal constitutional rights of
the alien against the "plenary" power of the federal government was
emphasized by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy :9
The power of Congress to exclude, admit or deport aliens flows from
sovereignty itself and from the power "To establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization . . . ." The power of deportation is therefore an
implied one. The right to life and liberty is an express one. Why this
implied power should be given priority over the express guarantee of
the Fifth Amendment has never been satisfactorily answered.60
This same argument applies with even greater force to congres-
sional control over the employment of aliens who have been legally
admitted to the United States. Analogy can be made to another
case in which the political nature of the issue was in question. Re-
ferring to the war power, the Court in United States v. Robe16 ' said,
"[w]hen Congress' exercise of . . . powers clashes with those indi-
vidual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our 'delicate and
difficult task' to determine whether the resulting restrictions on
freedom can be tolerated. ' 6 2
The conclusion is inevitable that even the broadest interpretation
of federal plenary power over aliens will not suffice to remove the
denial of federal civil service employment from the judicial arena.
The Argument for Strict Scrutiny
The preceding section demonstrates that congressional action im-
posing a disability on aliens should be held subject to constitutional
restraints. The question then arises: What standard should a court
apply in reviewing a statute for compliance with those restraints?
In light of Graham v. Richardson, 63 a viable argument can be made
that a "strict scrutiny" standard of review ought to be applied to any
regulation limiting federal civil service employment to citizens.
Strict scrutiny is the standard applied to an enactment which bur-
dens a "suspect class" or which infringes on a "fundamental inter-
est."64 A unanimous Court in Graham described aliens as a class as
59. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
60. d. at 599 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
61. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
62. Id. at 264.
63. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
64. Id. at 375; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
While a suspect classification alone is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, an
argument can also be made that the right to work is a "fundamental interest." In
"a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. . . for whom
such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."6 5
Other cases which have applied the "suspect classification" stan-
dard to aliens have shed light on the reasoning behind it. In a case
decided before Graham, the California Supreme Court found a stat-
ute prohibiting employment of aliens on public works unconstitu-
tional.6 The court judicially noted that aliens in general suffer from
prejudice. The court further stated that aliens, because they are
denied the right to vote, lack the most basic means of defending
themselves in the political processes. In view of these circumstances,
it was concluded, courts should view legislation discriminating
against aliens with "special solicitude."67
The lack of the franchise distinguishes aliens from other "suspect"
classes. Without the vote, the alien cannot effect political change, he
cannot bring his case before legislative assemblies, and he is deprived
of the "remedial channels of the democratic process." 68 Because he
lacks any voice in the political arena, it is especially important that
the alien be heard in the courtroom.
To compound the disability of the lack of franchise, aliens are in
many respects a politically unpopular group. One federal court, in
Faruki v. Rogers, 69 described the application of the compelling inter-
est test to statutes drawn on lines of race or nationality as "the means
an early case, a federal court stated that "[n]o enumeration. . . of the privileges
[and] immunities.. . of man in civilized society ... would exclude the right to
labor for a living." In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 498 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880). The court held
that such a right is "as sacred as the right to life, for life is taken if the means
whereby we live be taken." Id.
According to the California Supreme Court in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,
71 Cal. 2d 566, 579, 456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1969), "[a]ny limitation
on the opportunity for employment impedes the achievement of economic secu-
rity, which is essential for the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness; courts
sustain such limitations only after careful scrutiny." (emphasis added).
In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), the right to work was described by
the Supreme Court as being "of the very essence of personal freedom. .. "
Finally, it should be noted that the number of federal government employees
in 1975 exceeded the number employed in any of the following major industries:
lumber, electrical equipment and supplies, transportation equipment, apparel
and textile products and printing and publishing. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 92-93 (Bulletin 1905,
1976).
To arbitrarily exclude aliens from what the Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976), referred to as "a major sector of the economy" is
certainly a significant deprivation.
65. 403 U.S. at 372.
66. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1969).
67. Id. at 580, 456 P.2d at 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
68. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 180 (1946).
69. 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972).
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by which the judiciary ensures that such laws represent more than an
official expression of naked prejudice."M The court in Faruki struck
down a federal statute which required ten years residency before a
naturalized citizen could be appointed as a Foreign Service officer.
According to the court, such classifications, like those based on race,
appear to be a product of prejudice against, and oppression of, poorly
represented minority groups.7'
Extending the Strict Scrutiny Standard to Federal Action
The alien's status as a member of a "suspect class" seems secure as
applied to state discrimination. 7 1
The Supreme Court has, in the past, applied to congressional legis-
lation the same rules as to classifications which are applied in exam-
ining state legislation.73 The implication is that the validity of federal
legislation is tested, under the fifth amendment, by the same rules of
equality as is state legislation under the fourteenth.
In addition, some support for extending the alien's "suspect" clas-
sification, and therefore applying strict scrutiny to a federal statute,
can be found in Nielson v. Secretary of Treasury.74 According to
this case, the burden is on the government to put forth the rea-
sonableness of, and justification for, a measure discriminating
against aliens.7 5
A federal district court applied Graham, holding unconstitutional
federal action which resulted in discrimination against Filipinos who
had served in the American armed forces during World War 11.76
Because of the federal government's failure to appoint a naturaliza-
tion officer for a period of nine months, Filipinos otherwise eligible
for naturalization 7 were unable to avail themselves of the opportu-
70. Id. at 728.
71. Id. at 729.
72. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), applied the strict scrutiny stand-
ard to discrimination against aliens in state civil service employment. See also
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
73. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); District of
Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909).
74. 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 846.
76. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
77. Eligibility would have been under the Nationality Act of Oct. 14, 1940,
Pub. L. No. 853, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended at ch. 199, §§ 701-705, 56 Stat.
182 (current version at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1440 (West 1970)).
nity. The court conceded the "reasonable concern" of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service for the maintenance of amicable
relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands. 78
But the court concluded that concern alone, when considered in the
light of "the suspect nature of the classification" and "the strictness
of the applicable constitutional standards," was insufficient justifi-
cation for violating the petitioners' rights.79
In reviewing the same civil service regulation found unconstitu-
tional in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 80 the appellate court in Jalil v.
Hampton 8 conceded that "[t]he federal government has interests
different from those applicable to the states, but nonetheless it must
demonstrate that its interests justify the discrimination against
aliens. 82 The Jalil court remanded the case for determination of the
limits of statutory and delegated authority. Judge Bazelon, in dis-
sent, cited Nielson v. Secretary of Treasury.8 He concluded that the
principles of Graham apply fully to the federal government.84
The Result of Applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard
Once it is decided that the standard of strict scrutiny applies, the
ordinary presumption of validity of a government action is reversed.
The burden shifts to the government to justify the discrimination. 85
Under this standard, not only must the classification reasonably
relate to the purposes of the law, but the state, in addition, must bear
the burden of establishing that the classification is "necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest."8
Were such a strict standard applied to legislation prohibiting
aliens from federal civil service, it would be the government's dif-
ficult task to propose a compelling interest which would be furthered
by such discrimination. In addition, because the discrimination must
be "necessary" to that interest, the government would be required to
show that the statute was drawn with "precision"-that is, "tai-
78. The Philippine government was apparently fearful that, on the eve of
Philippine independence (which was to occur on July 4, 1946), large numbers of
Filipinos would be naturalized and emigrate to the United States. An uniden-
tified official of the Philippine government conveyed this concern to the United
States Department of State. The Commissioner of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service requested that the Attorney General revoke the naturalization
power of the Vice Consul assigned to the Philippines and that no new naturaliza-
tion officer be named. 406 F. Supp. at 935-36.
79. Id. at 951.
80. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
81. 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
82. Id. at 929.
83. 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
84. Id. at 930 (dissenting opinion).
85. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
86. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (first emphasis added).
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lored" to serve the legitimate objectives.87 If any less burdensome
alternative were available, the government would be required to
choose it.
The application of these requirements in the federal employment
situation would result in a burden nearly impossible for the govern-
ment to meet. According to Justice Marshall, race, nationality and
alienage are "in most circumstances irrelevant" to any constitution-
ally acceptable legislative purpose.88 The federal district court in In
re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans89 pointed out that
seldom has a state or the federal government been able to meet the
burden placed on it to justify discrimination based on alienage. When
it has met that burden, it has been under circumstances which were
truly exceptional." The court then referred to Korematsu v. United
States"' which upheld restrictions on persons of Japanese ancestry
during World War II because of "circumstances of direst emergency
and peril.
9 2
Although there may be several legitimate interests of the federal
government which would be furthered by the blanket exclusion of
aliens from the federal civil service,93 it is likely that the "broad
sweep" would invalidate any such restriction under strict scrutiny.
Dissenting in Jalil v. Hampton, Judge Bazelon concluded that it was
inconceivable that the Government could establish a compelling
state interest which would justify the exclusion of all aliens from all
positions in the competitive civil service.94
The Rational Relationship Test
As has been shown,95 alienage is a suspect classification triggering
strict scrutiny as against the states; it should therefore be equally
suspect in federal legislation. A reviewing court, however, may not
feel compelled to reach such a conclusion. As previously discussed,
the federal government, as an incident of sovereignty, has a degree of
87. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
88. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105
(1973) (dissenting opinion).
89. 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
90. Id. at 950.
91. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
92. Id. at 220.
93. See notes 105-54 and accompanying text infra.
94. 460 F.2d 923, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
95. See notes 72-84 and accompanying text supra.
control over the alien which a state cannot assert. It is arguable,
therefore, that in reviewing federal legislation which discriminates
against aliens, the court may require only a rational relationship
between the law and a constitutionally permissible objective.
A regulation is said to be rationally related to an objective if the
regulation produces effects that advance, rather than retard, or have
no bearing on the attainment of the objective. 6 Even under this less
stringent standard, however, a distinction between different classes
of persons must be reasonable rather than arbitrary and must be
based upon some ground of difference which has a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons simi-
larly circumstanced are treated alike. 7
The measure of scrutiny a court will afford legislation under the
rational relationship standard is not entirely clear and may vary
according to the type of classification involved. In recent cases, 98
while declining to apply strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that it will examine the purpose proposed in support of a
statute based on a sexual classification.9 In Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld'0 0 the Court expressly stated that the recitation of a benign
purpose is not an "automatic shield" protecting against inquiry into
the actual purpose of a statute. 101 A federal statute denying equal
protection on the basis of an alienage classification would seem to
deserve at least that level of inquiry.
The Second Circuit appeared to be using a standard very similar to
that of Wiesenfeld in a recent deportation case.1 12 The court held
unconstitutional a statutory interpretation subjecting aliens within a
particular group to "disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated
to any legitimate governmental interest.' 10 3
96. P. BREST, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1004 (1975).
97. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
98. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1974).
99. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), dealt with a gender-based
distinction mandated by a federal statute, the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §
402(g) (1970)). It is interesting to note that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976),
cited Wiesenfeld for the proposition that "[e]qual protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
100. 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
101. In addition, the Court said that it "need not in equal protection cases
accept at face value assertions of legislative purpose, when an examination of
the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose
could not have been a goal of the legislation." Id. n.16.
102. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 273. The Francis case challenged the application of a statute (I. &
N. Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970)) which had been construed to allow a
lawfully admitted alien, convicted of a narcotics offense, who departed from
and returned to the United States to an unrelinquished domicile, to be permitted
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Even under the traditional rational relationship test, however, the
standards of "reasonable" classification and "substantial" relation
between the classification and the object of the legislation must be
met. Following is an analysis of potential federal interests which the
government might seek to serve through the exclusion of aliens from
the federal civil service. Although, with the exception of the protec-
tion of resources, they appear to be legitimate goals which the gov-
ernment may promote, the means used-the exclusion of aliens from
federal employment-will not, in fact, promote the ends which the
government is pursuing.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, while conceding the legitimate interest of the Civil Service
Commision in administrative efficiency, also stated: "Any fair
balancing of the public interest in avoiding the wholesale depriva-
tion of employment opportunities caused by the Commission's indis-
criminate policy, as opposed to what may be nothing more than
hypothetical justification, requires rejection of the argument of ad-
ministrative convenience in this case."1 4
The implication is clear that, even under the rational relationship
test, because of the "quality of the interest at stake," the Court will
require at least some evidence on the part of the government in
support of any hypothetical interest it claims to be pursuing through
the denial of federal civil service employment to aliens.
Administrative Efficiency
The Civil Service Commission argued in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong that the need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive posi-
tions justified a citizenship requirement in at least some areas of the
federal service and that the broad exclusion of aliens served the
adminstrative purpose of avoiding the trouble and expense of clas-
sifying those positions.105 This same justification had been raised in
Sugarman v. Dougall.1 6 The Court in Sugarman held that the state's
interest in an employee of undivided loyalty is substantial, but it
to remain in the United States at the Attorney General's discretion. Petitioner
had never made such a temporary departure. Therefore, the Attorney General
was statutorily without discretion to allow petitioner, a lawfully admitted alien
convicted of a narcotics offense, to remain in the United States despite an
unrelinquished domicile of more than seven years.
104. 426 U.S. at 115-16 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 104.
106. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
went on to say that the justification "proves both too much and too
little."'1 7 The state's broad prohibition of the employment of aliens
was found to apply to many positions to which the state's claimed
justification had little relationship. 10 8 The Mow Sun Wong Court,
although recognizing the need for loyalty in some positions, rejected
administrative efficiency as a justification for the nearly total ban on
aliens imposed by the Civil Service Commission regulation. 10 9 The
Court concluded that the quality of the interest at stake was so
substantial that what may have been only a hypothetical justification
of administrative convenience on the part of the Commission was
insufficient to support the blanket deprivation of employment to
aliens." 0
The second possible prong of the administrative convenience argu-
ment might be the contention that aliens, in general, would be less
efficent or qualified employees because of the lack of language or
other skills. A reviewing court ought certainly to require some
evidentiary basis to support such a theory. However, even if such a
generalization were shown to be true, the examination process estab-
lished by the federal civil service has been designed as a screening
device to assure fairness and accuracy in the selection process. 1'
Because United States citizens are chosen through this indi-
vidualized process, it would create no additional administrative bur-
den to evaluate the qualifications of aliens through this same
method. Using this reasoning, the court in Faruki v. Rogers"2 dis-
missed this aspect of administrative efficiency as an insufficient
rational basis to justify the durational residency requirement im-
posed on naturalized citizens as a prerequisite to appointment as a
Foreign Service Officer."
An invocation of the governmental interest of administrative effi-
ciency, therefore, seems likely to fail as a rational basis for the
blanket exclusion of aliens in the federal civil service. No court has
denied the government's right to exclude aliens from direct partici-
pation in the formulation, execution or review of public policy, or
positions affecting the national security." 4 When an employment ban
107. Id. at 642.
108. Id.
109. 426 U.S. at 115. In reaching this conclusion, the Court said: "Nor can we
reasonably infer that the administrative burden of establishing the job classifi-
cations for which citizenship is an appropriate requirement would be a particu-
larly onerous task for an expert in personnel matters...." Id.
110. Id. at 115, 116.
111. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3304, 3308 (1970).
112. 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972).
113. Id. at 734.
114. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 104 (1976); Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
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extends, however, to the "sanitation man, class B" 5 and the clerical
worker, as well as to those who participate in the formulation and
execution of important policy decisions, the citizenship requirement
is vastly overbroad. This sweeping exclusion bears no rational rela-
tionship to the asserted governmental interest of promoting adminis-
trative efficiency.
Bargaining Power for Treaty Negotiation Purposes
It was suggested by the Civil Service Commission in the Mow Sun
Wong case that the broad exclusion of aliens in the federal service
may facilitate the President's negotiation of treaties with foreign
nations by allowing him to offer employment opportunities to citi-
zens of a given foreign country in exchange for reciprocal conces-
sions." 6
As previously discussed, the federal government has virtual ple-
nary power over the admission, exclusion, and deportation of
aliens."' Sufficient bargaining power in the negotiation of treaties
can be found in these rights of sovereignty without trading away the
constitutional protections of those aliens who have been legally ad-
mitted to the United States.
Further, one must ask whether the exclusion of aliens bears a
reasonable relationship to the federal interest asserted. Is it rea-
sonable to condition the employment of an alien in the United States
on, for example, the willingness of his native country to ship us oil? Is
it reasonable to refuse employment to the alien whose native country
has nothing for which we wish to bargain? Is it reasonable to assume
that the behavior of other countries will actually be affected by such
a threat? Once an alien has immigrated to the United States and
indicated an intention to take up permanent residence here, it seems
unlikely that his native country would have such a continuing inter-
est in his employment opportunities that it would be willing to make
significant foreign policy concessions to promote them.
In Reed v. Reed" 8 the Supreme Court recognized the unfairness of
grounding an automatic preference for ,state-related kinds of em-
ployment on a factor over which a person has no control." 9 Frontiero
115. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
116. 426 U.S. at 104.
117. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
118. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
119. Id. at 76-77.
v. Richardson2 ' described the sex classification as an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.121 This
same characterization might be applied to the classification of an
alien based upon the assets and cooperation of his native country. If
the bargaining power rationale were truly viable, the federal govern-
ment could grant employment to one alien because his native govern-
ment is cooperative and obliging, while denying it to another whose
government is not as receptive to our diplomatic overtures. That
would hardly accord with fairness. In neither of these situations
would the alien residing in this country have an iota of control.
Finally, the bargaining power rationale is invalid because it proves
too much. Under such a theory, the federal government could con-
ceivably impose almost any disability it wished upon the alien and
dismiss his protest with the magic words "bargaining power." If the
alien's native country has as strong an interest in his welfare as
would be necessary to support discrimination in employment, there
is no reason to assume the contrary when even greater deprivations
are at issue.
Schneider v. Rusk 2 recognized the constitutional limits on the
extent to which the furthering of foreign relations can justify depri-
vation of individual rights. The government in Schneider argued that
by returning to her native country and residing there for over three
years, Mrs. Schneider, a naturalized American citizen, had relin-
quished her American citizenship. 2 ' Possible conflicts with foreign
countries, contended the government, justified this use of the foreign
relations power. The Court disagreed and, in effect, found no rational
relationship between deprivation of citizenship and the conduct of
foreign affairs.'24 The same reasoning applies to invalidate the "bar-
gaining power" theory, even under the rational relationship standard
of scrutiny.
Providing an Incentive for Naturalization
The final justification proferred by the Civil Service Commission
in Mow Sun Wong was that reserving the federal service for citizens
would provide an incentive to aliens to qualify for naturalization,
thereby participating more effectively in our society. 12
120. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
121. Id. at 686.
122. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
123. Id. at 164.
124. Id. at 166, 167. It should also be noted that Schneider dealt with naturali-
zation, a matter over which Congress has explicit constitutional authority. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. As discussed earlier (see text accompanying notes 40.55
supra), Congress has no such explicit authority over the regulation of alien
conduct within the United States.
125. 426 U.S. at 104.
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Accepting the contention that encouraging naturalization is a
legitimate goal of the federal government, denial of federal civil
service employment is not an appropriate means to that end.
First, an alien is not ordinarily entitled to apply for naturalization
until he has resided continuously in the United States for five years
after admission for permanent residency. 126 Until expiration of the
five-year period, the alien, of whom there are hundreds of thousands
at any one time,127 has no more control over his status than did the
petitioner in Frontiero over her sex. It makes little sense to "encour-
age" an alien to become naturalized when the law explicitly prevents
him from doing so.
Second, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 128 New York had attempted to
justify an English literacy requirement as part of its voting qualifica-
tions.'2 9 The Supreme Court expressed doubt as to whether denial of
a right deemed "so precious and fundamental" in our society was a
necessary or appropriate means to encourage people to learn Eng-
lish.' Although voting is considered a fundamental right, an analo-
gy to the federal civil service area might also cast doubt on the
reasonableness of depriving the alien of the important right to work
as a necessary or appropriate means of encouraging naturalization.
Finally, upholding the encouragement of naturalization as a jus-
tification for denying federal employment leads to the same inevitable
conclusion as did the bargaining power rationale. The deprivation of
any privilege could arguably "encourage" the alien who is qualified
to become a naturalized citizen.'3 ' In effect, this would appear to
126. I. & N. Act § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970). Id. § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a)
shortens this period to three years for an alien who is married to a United States
citizen.
127. Each year, exclusive of what are referred to as "immediate relatives"
(see id. § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)), a total of 170,000 people are admitted
to the United States for permanent residence from the Eastern Hemisphere. Id.
§ 201(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a) (West Supp. 1977). The yearly quota for the Western
Hemisphere is 120,000. Id.
128. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
129. The Court first questioned whether this was the interest actually being
served, or whether prejudice may have played a role in the enactment. Id. at 654.
That same inquiry would be appropriate in examining any legislation denying
employment to aliens.
130. Id.
131. The logic of this argument was recently conceded by the Supreme Court
in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct. 2120 (1977). In this case, resident aliens who did
not intend to become citizens were barred from state financial assistance for
higher education. It was argued that the statute served to encourage aliens to
constitute force tantamount to blackmail to compel the alien to take
advantage of what has been characterized as a "right" and a
",privilege.' ' 132
The Protection of Resources
Although not proposed by the government in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong,'13 the theory that a citizen has a special public interest in the
distribution of resources has, in the past, carried some weight in
upholding discriminatory treatment of aliens. This rationale was
held to support a citizenship qualification in public works employ-
ment in Crane v. New York. 134 The district court in Mow Sun Wong v.
Hampton3 ' found, as an alternative basis for upholding the civil
service regulation, that the regulation may have been intended to
serve the economic security of citizens through reserving civil service
positions to them rather than to aliens. 136
The Supreme Court, in Graham v. Richardson, 13 1 held that in light
of Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,38 the validity of the
special public interest doctrine was in doubt. Takahashi rejected
citizen ownership of state resources as a rationale for restricting
state fishing licenses to citizens. The Graham court concluded that
the "special public interest" doctrine was an insufficient basis on
which to preserve limited state welfare benefits to citizens. 13 9 Sugar-
man v. Dougall40 extended Graham's holding to a state public em-
ployment situation.
The "special public interest" theory is especially questionable as
applied to aliens, for resident aliens contribute on an equal basis to
federal tax funds.' Many states also impose tax liability on alien
residents. 42 Because of this contribution to the public treasury, the
alien has the same interest as the citizen in determining how that
money ought to be expended.
become naturalized citizens. Id. at 2126. The Court rejected this as a valid
concern of the state, but went on to say that even if it were valid, it would be
inadequate to support such a ban: "If the encouragement of naturalization
through these programs were seen as adequate, then every discrimination
against aliens could be similarly justified. The exception would swallow the
rule." Id. at 2127.
132. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Maney v. United States,
278 U.S. 17 (1928); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
133. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
134. 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
135. 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
136. Id. at 532.
137. 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
138. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
139. 403 U.S. at 372-74.
140. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
141. 26 C.F.R. § 1.871-1(a) (1976).
142. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17041(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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A final argument can be levelled against the distribution of re-
sources theory. The exclusion of aliens limits the group of job appli-
cants, some of whom would otherwise have qualified for federal
employment. The limitation therefore reduces the overall quality of
the public work force and decreases the efficiency of job perform-
ance. The result is either a net increase in cost to the public or a
decrease in the quality of work produced.143
Related to this "special public interest" theory is the contention,
occasionally voiced, that public employment is a "privilege" rather
than a "right." Therefore, according to this view, the government
need not make this "privilege" available to all on an equal basis. This
idea was expressed in Rok v. Legg,' which upheld federal restric-
tions on alien employment in public works projects. Relying on Peo-
ple v. Crane,'45 the federal district court concluded that whatever is a
governmental privilege, as opposed to a right, may be made depen-
dent upon citizenship. 46
Graham and Sugarman, however, appear to have laid this distinc-
tion to rest. Sugarman expressly rejected the concept that constitu-
tional rights may depend upon whether a governmental benefit is
characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege."' 47 Recognizing that a
state has a valid interest in preserving fiscal integrity, the Graham
Court added that such a goal could not be accomplished through
invidious distinctions.48
The "special public interest" in a limited resource and the right/
privilege dichotomy appear, therefore, to have no viability in the
defense of discriminatory treatment of aliens in federal employment.
Allegiance to and Identity with the Government
A final rationale which the government might propound as provid-
ing a rational basis for excluding aliens is the necessity for allegiance
to, and identification with, the government in general. While similar
to the administrative efficiency argument, this theory would extend
143. See Inge v. Board of Pub. Works, 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678 (1902); City St.
Improvement Co. v. Kroh, 158 Cal. 308, 110 P. 933 (1910). See also text accom-
panying notes 178-84 infra.
144. 27 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
145. 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, 150 N.Y.S. 933 (1915).
146. 27 F. Supp. at 245.
147. 413 U.S. at 644.
148. 403 U.S. at 374.
beyond positions which are "sensitive" or involve "national securi-
ty.")
Under the Military Selective Service Act,'49 resident aliens must
register for the draft 50 and are liable for induction on the same basis
as citizens. 5' Upon induction, the alien must swear to uphold the
Constitution of the United States. 52 By federal statute, 5 ' all those
elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service
must take an oath of allegiance. 4 An alien, as well as a citizen who
wished to qualify for the federal civil service, could be required to
take this oath. If the sufficiency of an alien's allegiance to the United
States is not questioned for the purpose of serving in the military, it
would seem a blatant double standard to imply that the alien's oath
is insufficient evidence of allegiance to qualify for federal civil ser-
vice employment.
EXECUTIVE POWER OVER FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS
Despite the foregoing arguments, a reviewing court may be per-
suaded that the federal government has the power to impose a dis-
crimination against aliens in civil service employment which would
be unconstitutional if imposed by a state. If so, the question arises: Is
Executive Order No. 11935 a valid exercise of this federal power?
Sources of Executive Power over Aliens
The President's authority "to issue. . . [an Executive] order must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution it-
self.""' President Ford professed to be relying on both constitutional
and statutory authority in the promulgation of Executive Order No.
11935.56
However, the President's constitutional power to regulate the con-
duct of aliens already admitted into the United States rests on even
149. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-473 (1970).
150. Id. § 453.
151. Id. § 454(a).
152. 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970).
154. The oath taken by all but the President is as follows:
I, -, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States againt all enemies, foreign and domes-
tic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same ....
155. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
156. The introduction to the Executive Order states:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and stat-
utes of the United States of America, including, Sections 3301 and 3302
of Title 5 of the United States Code, and as President of the United
States of America, Civil Service Rule VII (5 CFR Part 7) is hereby
amended by adding thereto the following new section ....
41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976).
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more tenuous grounds than does the power of Congress. Like Con-
gress, the President has no explicit constitutional authority in this
area. What power he may have over aliens must apparently be de-
rived from the power over the conduct of foreign affairs. 117
What is generally referred to as the President's "foreign affairs
power" appears to derive not only from his constitutional powers to
make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate,'58 and to act
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed service,'59 but also from the
powers of external sovereignty vested in the federal government as
necessary accompaniments to its political existence. 60 These
sovereign powers have been described as the power to acquire terri-
tory by discovery and occupation, the power to expel undesirable
aliens, and the power to make international agreements which are
not treaties in the constitutional sense.161
Granting the broad executive power in the field of international
relations, the control of the employment opportunities of aliens, once
lawfully admitted into this country, is only through the most tenuous
and strained interpretation a control over foreign relations. 162 The
mere assertion, without support, that an Executive Order regulating
domestic employment is an exercise of the foreign affairs power
ought to be seriously questioned by a reviewing court.
In the absence of authority under the foreign affairs power for the
Executive Order, the President must rely on the statutory authority
granted him through the civil service laws enacted by Congress.6 3
When the President's action is restricted to the limits of statutory
157. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, says the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
This section gives the President no direct constitutional authority over em-
ployment within the civil service. The civil service positions denied to aliens by
Exec. Order No. 11935 are not appointive but competitive positions. Those
holding such positions are not "officers" but are agents or employees of the
federal government. McGrath v. United States, 275 F. 294, 300 (2d Cir. 1921).
158. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
159. Id., cl. 1.
160. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
161. Id. at 318.
162. See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
163. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3302 (1970).
authority, the validity of his action must be measured by those con-
gressional limits which the President must follow.'6 4 The authority of
an executive officer to make regulations to enforce a statute is lim-
ited to the making of regulations which are within the power granted
and which are reasonable. 165
Analysis of the Applicable Statute
The Five Specific Criteria Mentioned
The statutory power on which President Ford relied in his Execu-
tive Order is set forth at 5 U.S.C. section 3301.166 Although the
statute appears to provide general power, five specific criteria (age,
health, character, knowledge and ability) which the President may
consider in ascertaining fitness for employment are listed in 5 U.S.C.
section 3301(2). The legislative history of the Pendleton Act,167 which
created the federal civil service, indicates that no mention was made
of a citizenship requirement, although other specific qualifications
were proposed.'6 8
The fact that the criteria of "age, health, character, knowledge and
ability" were enumerated would imply the exclusion of others. This
was the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Addison v. Holly Hill
Fruit Products. 69 In that case, Congress had enumerated eleven
classes which were exempted from the wage and hour provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court felt that exemptions made
in such detail precluded their enlargement by implication. " '
164. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 557 n.20 (1956).
165. Loglisci v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 123 Conn. 31, 192 A. 260 (1937).
166. The statute, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
§3301. The President may-
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals
into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote
the efficiency of that service;(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, charac-
ter, knowledge, and ability for the employment sought ....
5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970).
§ 3302, on which the President also purported to rely, provides:
The President may prescribe rules governing the competitive service.
The rules shall provide, as nearly as conditions of good administration
warrant, for-(l) necessary exceptions of positions from the competitive
service; and(2) necessary exceptions from the provisions of sections 2951,
3304(a), 3306(a)(1), 3321, 7152, 7153, 7321, and 7322 of this title.
Id. § 3302.
Neither this section itself, nor the power to provide for exceptions to the
sections listed in § 3302(2), grants the President any direct authority to exclude
aliens from the competitive service.
167. 14 CONG. REC. S133, 860 (1883).
168. Id. §§ 1, 3, 7.
169. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
170. Id. at 617.
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In Cole v. Young, 171 the Court invalidated an Executive Order 1
2
implementing an act of Congress. In that instance, Congress had
given the President discretion to apply the Summary Suspension
Act 7 to agencies of the government if he felt the national security
was threatened. 1 4 The Court held that "national security" must be
narrowly defined.1 5 It reasoned that Congress did not intend the
term to be broad enough to include all activities of the government;
otherwise, it would not have specified certain agencies-for example,
State, Justice, and Defense Departments-within the Act.
The same reasoning applies to Executive Order No. 11935. Had
Congress intended the President to be free to use his absolute discre-
tion to decide what would "best promote the efficiency of the ser-
vice" there would have been no need to specify the five criteria listed
in 5 U.S.C. section 3301(2).
Is Exclusion Regulation?
If the power to regulate with respect to citizenship can be found in
5 U.S.C. section 3301, it is arguable that in effectively excluding all
aliens from the federal service, the President exceeded and miscon-
strued the term "regulation."
The language of 5 U.S.C. section 3301(1) makes it apparent that
Congress intended the President to prescribe regulations for admis-
sion into the civil service. The blanket exclusion of Executive Order
No. 11935 is, in effect, a refusal to define and prescribe specific
standards which allow for admission to federal employment. The
decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong lends some support to this
contention. The Court interpreted Executive Order No. 10577, which
instructed the Civil Service Commission "to establish standards with
respect to citizenship," as "not necessarily a command to require
citizenship as a general condition of eligibility for federal employ-
ment. Rather it is equally, if not more reasonably, susceptible of
interpretation as a command to classify positions for which citizen-
ship should be required."'176
171. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
172. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2,489 (1953).
173. Act of Aug. 26, 1950, Pub. L. No. 733, ch. 803, 64 Stat. 476. The Act
authorized heads of specified federal agencies to summarily dismiss employees
upon.determining that dismissal was necessary or advisable in the interest of
national security.
174. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
175. Id. at 551.
176. 426 U.S. at 112.
Judge Bazelon, in his dissenting opinion in Jalil, appeared to agree
that exclusion is not regulation: "A regulation which simply ex-
cludes all aliens from all competitive positions on its face sets no
standards. . . and is therefore invalid. We should not hesitate to say
SO. ))
1 7 7
Does the Exclusion of Aliens Promote Efficiency?
The language of 5 U.S.C. section 3301(1) directs the President to regu-
late in such a way as will "best promote the efficiency of that service." It
is certainly arguable that automatic exclusion of essentially the en-
tire alien population of the United States from the ranks of those
eligible for the competitive service is not conducive to efficient oper-
ation. ' The Supreme Court recognized this in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong. Referring to the concern of the Civil Service Commission in
providing for an efficient federal service, the Court said that in
general it would be fair to assume that the goal of efficiency would be
best served by removing unnecessary restrictions on the eligibility of
qualified job applicants. 79
Many aliens are highly educated and technically skilled individu-
als. '8 Other than those aliens who are admitted to the United States
on the basis of qualifications as relatives or refugees,'8 ' the prospec-
tive immigrant must be granted labor certification from the Secre-
tary of Labor. 82 To receive such certification, aliens must, in effect,
prove their potential usefulness in the United States labor market.
The Labor Department must be satisfied that the immigrant has
skills which are needed in this country.
8 3
Labor Department statistics indicate that immigrants have a high-
er percentage of professionally trained people than the United States
population at large. 84 If eligibility for federal civil service were
177. 460 F.2d at 931 (emphasis in original).
178. See text preceding note 143 supra.
179. 426 U.S. at 115.
180. See, e.g., I. & N. Act § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1970), which gives
preference in immigration to those with special abilities in the arts and sciences.
Id. § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6), gives preference to immigrants who can
perform specified skilled or unskilled labor.
181. Id. §§ 203, 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1154.
182. Id. § 203(a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(8).
183. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 10
(Research Monograph No. 31, 1974). Congress has codified, in great detail, the
requirements for the admission of permanent residents to the United States.
See I. & N. Act §§ 201-204,211-212,8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154, 1181-1182 (1970). As part
of this scheme, the labor certification program has been developed to assure
that the employment of aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions in the United States.
184. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 23
(Research Monograph No. 31, 1974).
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based on ability and education rather than citizenship, which is
rarely directly related to job performance, it is obvious that the
efficiency of the service would be enhanced. Under Executive Order
No. 11935, the federal civil service is deprived of the opportunity to
tap the resource of many thousands of skilled and qualified people.
In excluding this large segment of qualified workers, Executive Or-
der No. 11935 not only fails to "best promote the efficiency" of the
federal service, but actually contradicts the explicit statutory direc-
tive which the President purports to be following.
Potential Conflict with Congressional Power over Immigration
As has been shown, the President has no firm basis, either constitu-
tional or by statute, for Executive Order No. 11935. In addition,
whatever power the President may have over the employment oppor-
tunities of aliens may be limited by the recognized congressional
control over the admission, exclusion and deportation of aliens.
State laws regulating alien employment have often been struck
down, both on equal protection grounds and on the basis of conflict
with congressional control over immigration. 185 In Purdy & Fitzpat-
rick v. State,8 6 the supreme court of California struck down a state
statute refusing aliens the right to employment on public works
projects. The court found that the statute encroached upon Congress'
power over immigration and naturalization by depriving aliens of the
right to work and, therefore, deterring immigration and subsequent
entry of lawfully admitted aliens into California.'87 The Court in
Truax expressed the basis for this conflict when it said that to deny
to aliens the opportunity to earn a livelihood once lawfully admitted
to the state is tantamount to denial of entrance and abode. 8'
Arguably, any attempt by the President, whether by statute or
under the foreign affairs power, to regulate employment of an alien
once lawfully admitted, would be in derogation of the congressional
statutory scheme regulating immigration. It might, therefore, be
found invalid under the separation of powers doctrine, as were the
state regulations mentioned under the supremacy doctrine.
185. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
186. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
187. Id. at 573, 456 P.2d at 650, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
188. 239 U.S. at 42.
While the President may, in certain circumstances, exercise some
control over the admission and exclusion of aliens,189 in general that
power rests with Congress. 9 ' The Immigration and Nationality
Act' 91 is Congress' expression of that power, and it is a complete and
comprehensive scheme. The Act sets out in detail the categories of
admissible aliens, taking into consideration the employment poten-
tial and professional qualifications of the applicant for admission.'92
Executive Order No. 11935 is not intended as a direct exercise of
executive power over the admission of aliens. It may, however, oper-
ate as did state employment laws-as an exclusion of aliens. If so, it
impinges on an area already thoroughly regulated by Congress. A
reviewing court ought to follow, in that case, the last expression of
the legislative branch and invalidate the Executive Order.
Infringement on the Alien's Constitutional Rights
Aside from the issue of conflict with congressional control over
immigration, an exercise of the President's foreign affairs power
must still be balanced against the individual constitutional rights of
the alien.'9 3
The Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 1 while setting forth the broad parameters of the foreign
affairs power, made the point that it, "like every other governmental
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provi-
sions of the Constitution.' ' 95 In New York Times Co. v. United
States, 96 Justice Black's concurring opinion made it clear that the
executive power over the conduct of foreign affairs was not, in itself,
sufficient to justify enjoining publication of classified materials and
abridging freedom of the press in the name of "national security."' 9
The Court, in Zemel v. Rusk, 19 8 affirmed these limits, pointing out
189. The power of exclusion may be exercised through treaties by the Presi-
dent and Senate. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543 (1895). In
addition, under I. & N. Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1970), the President can
suspend the entry of any alien or class of aliens if entry would be detrimental to
the interests of the United States.
190. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538(1895); Brownlow v. Miers, 28 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1928); Savelis v. Vlachos, 137 F.
Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd., 248 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1957).
191. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
192. See, e.g., I. & N. Act § 203(a)(3), (a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3), (a)(6) (1970);.
See also note 180 supra.
193. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 31-62 supra.
194. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
195. Id. at 320.
196. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
197. Id. at 718-20.
198. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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that, simply because he is dealing with foreign relations, the Execu-
tive is not vested with totally unrestricted freedom of choice.'9 9
The district court in Faruki v. Rogers2"' refused to grant special
deference to a federal statute limiting foreign service employment
simply because the statute may have been related to the conduct of
foreign affairs. Where constitutionally protected rights are at stake,
the court felt that automatic notions of deference have no place.20 '
In conclusion, the broadest interpretation of the President's statu-
tory or foreign affairs power might yield some executive control over
the employment rights of permanent resident aliens. However, be-
cause of the serious impairment on the alien's right to be free from
invidious discrimination and the intrusion on the domain of Con-
gress, the balance should be struck in favor of federal employment of
aliens. Executive Order No. 11935 should be found invalid.
CONCLUSION
A United States Department of Labor study analyzed the impact of
resident aliens on the United States labor market. 0 2 As part of the
study, interviews were conducted with aliens and their employers.20 3
The interviewers found that aliens have a sincere belief in the work
ethic and a great deal of ambition.0 4 The study arrived at the follow-
ing conclusion: "That immigrants have been hard working, upwardly
mobile, and successful has been known to Americans for a long, long
time. The interviews of immigrants and their employers simply
showed it is still the case (and that employers still appreciate it)." 205
Disregarding the constitutional and statutory impediments in the
federal employment situation, one fact remains: There exists a pool
of ambitious, eager and capable individuals available for employ-
ment with the federal government. It is not only unfair to the alien
who is being denied employment, but also short-sighted and foolish
to allow prejudice and historical narrow-minded attitudes to prevent
199. Id. at 17.
200. 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972). See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra
for further discussion of the case.
201. 349 F. Supp. at 732.
202. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET
(Research Monograph No. 31, 1974).
203. The sample consisted of 115 immigrants who entered the United States
in 1970 and 201 employers of such immigrants. Id. at 35.
204. Id. at 45.
205. Id.
what could be an efficient and highly satisfactory employment rela-
tionship. The blanket prohibition on federal civil service employment
of aliens is not only unconstitutional, but practically undesirable as
well.
A reviewing court ought to recognize the equity and the logic in the
alien's case and refuse to deny him that right deemed "as sacred as
the right to life.
2 0 6
MARY A. FREEMAN
206. In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 498 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
